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The views expressed in this research paper are those of the 
author and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or 
position of the US Government, Department of Defense, US 
Southern Command or Florida International University.
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
 
Faced with the violence, criminality and insecurity now 
threatening peace and democratic governance in Central 
America, the region’s governments have decided to use the 
Armed Forces to carry out actions in response to criminal 
actions, looking to improve their performance.  Although 
public demand for including the Armed Forces in these 
functions takes place within a legally legitimate framework, 
it is motivated by tangible circumstances such as increased 
levels of violence, delinquency and crime. Despite being 
coupled with the perception of institutional weakness within 
the security and judicial system (particularly police) and the 
recognition of prestige, efficiency, discipline and severity in 
fulfilling the Armed Forces’ missions, these arguments are 
insufficient to legitimize the use of the military as a police 
force.  
 
Within this context, this paper reflects on the implications or 
consequences of the use of the Armed Forces in duties 
traditionally assigned to the police in the Central American 
region with the goal of contributing to the debate on this 
topic taking place in the Americas. To achieve this end, first 
we will focus on understanding the actual context in which a 
decision is made to involve the Armed Forces in security 
duties in the region. Second, we will examine the effects and 
implications of this decision on the Armed Forces’ relations 
within their respective societies. Third and finally, 
considering this is already a reality in the region, this paper 
will provide recommendations. The main findings of this 
research, resulting from the application of an analytical-
descriptive and historically based study, are organized in 
three dimensions: the political dimension, by implication 
referring to the relationship between the ultimate political 
authority and the Armed Forces; the social dimension, by 
implication the opinion of citizens; and other implications 
not only affecting the structural and cultural organization of 
armies and police but also the complementary operational 
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framework within a context of comprehensive response by 
the State. As a main conclusion, it poses there is an 
environment conducive to the use of the Armed Forces in 
citizen’s security, in view of the impact of threats provoked 
by criminal structures of a military nature currently operating 
in Central America.  However, this participation creates an 
inevitable social and political impact if implemented in 
isolation or given a political leading role and/or operational 
autonomy.  This participation poses risks to the institutions 
of the Armed Forces and the police as well. 
 
Finally, this paper identifies an urgent need for the Armed 
Forces’ role to be more clearly defined with regard to 
security matters, limiting it to threats that impact States’ 
governability and existence. Nonetheless, Central American 
States should seek a COMPREHENSIVE response to current 
crime and violence, using all necessary institutions to 
confront these challenges, but with defined roles and 
responsibilities for each and dynamic coordination to 
complement their actions.   
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CALLING IN THE ARMED FORCES  
 
Central America is a region suffering from the highest rates 
of violence and criminality, particularly Guatemala with 
more than 6,000 deaths annually. Guatemala, Honduras and 
El Salvador are seen as the most violent countries in the so-
called northern triangle (WOLA, 2009). In March 2010, the 
Executive Director of the United Nations Office on Drugs 
and Crime, Antonio Mario Acosta, publicly stated Central 
America is a region vulnerable to organized crime, as it has a 
larger population of young people, a weak security and 
justice system, underdevelopment and a more affordable 
market for weapons (Free Press, 2010). According to United 
Nations Development Programme (UNDP) (2009), in 
Central America there were 29.3 homicides per 100,000 
inhabitants in 2004, second only to South Africa with 31.7 
homicides per 100,000 inhabitants.  
 
These statistics are the result of actions by transnational 
organized crime
1
, which already employs methods, 
organizations, weapons, logistics and personnel with military 
characteristics, generating high levels of violence and 
insecurity. This leads to an increase of criminal typologies
2
 
from the loss of power and territorial control and citizen 
fatigue toward the inefficient response from the States. All 
these factors affect peace and democratic governance in the 
future and, if there is no change in terms of growth, it may 
constitute a real threat to the very existence of the States. 
The effects of crime show it has surpassed the capabilities of 
law enforcement institutions foreseen by democratic States, 
as the body responsible for controlling these phenomena.  
                                                 
1
 It is considered as a new threat, concern and challenge of diverse 
nature, to the security of the States of the hemisphere. For more details, 
see “Declaration on the Security in the Americas.” Organization of 
American States (OAS), Washington, DC. October 2003.  
2
 In this way, we have arms traffic and human traffic, crimes linked to 
drug trafficking, terrorism, maras’ international networks (as for Mara 
Salvatrucha MS-13gang) and their relation among themselves.  
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Given this reality, Central American States have recognized 
the need to organize in order to deal with this problem. They 
simultaneously respond by developing policies that minimize 
the causes of their structural weakness. In the field of 
security, they create strategies to contain and reduce the 
effects of threats and violent attacks on society.  
 
In the specific area of security, which is the subject of this 
report, States should use all instruments, mechanisms and 
their willingness to confront these threats and attacks, to try 
to fulfill the purposes enshrined in their charter.
3
   Within 
this context, Central American states have been forced to 
allocate duties normally assigned to the police in a 
democratic society, to the Armed Forces, with the goal of 
strengthening their operations in the absence of viable 
alternatives given the gravity of the situation.  
 
However, although the political decision to use the military 
for these roles is legally legitimate
4
  and motivated by the 
prevailing conditions of insecurity, growing public demand 
for effective responses, increasing perception of citizen 
insecurity, institutional weakness of judicial and security 
systems (particularly police) and a recognition of the Armed 
Forces’ institutional prestige, efficiency, discipline and 
severity in fulfilling their missions, these arguments, both 
                                                 
3
 Every state is organized with the purpose of preserving peace and 
security as well as to promote development but most important to 
guarantee the well being of all citizens, protect their lives and integrity in 
search of the supreme end which is the common good.  These duties 
constitute the essential goals of all States and are stated on international 
documents, Constitutional charters and norms.    
4
 In relation to this point, in various countries of Central America, like 
Guatemala and El Salvador, judicial mechanisms grant presidents the 
power to call for collaboration and use the armed forces in domestic 
security and public order when the civilian police forces are 
overwhelmed by crime and violence. At the same time, the norm creating 
the police in Nicaragua define its duties as requesting the President to 
approve  the support of the Nicaraguan Army in exceptional cases to 
maintain or reestablish public order and citizen’s security.  
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social and judicial in nature, are not enough to legitimize its 
use for law enforcement.  
 
The objection to the participation of the Armed Forces in this 
regard is based on several reasons. Sometimes society rejects 
this measure by arguing the military should not perform 
these duties  given the 1980’s peace agreements (which can 
be generalized to all Central American countries), as well as 
the dreadful memory of its role during the period of the 
region’s internal conflicts. More importantly, it requires a 
detailed analysis of the effects and implications of this type 
of decision on the Armed Forces, both in relation to the 
highest political authorities (political dimension) and civil 
society (social dimension), and its own organizational 
culture and relationship with the police (technical 
dimension). 
 
POLITICAL IMPLICATIONS  
 
The participation of the Armed Forces in police duties incurs 
several risks that have political implications. Some of these 
implications are discussed below.  
 
Credibility  
Disproportionate response by elements of the Armed Forces, 
within the framework of security support, involves the risk 
of gradual deterioration of the credibility people have for 
political authority and security institutions.  This risk is 
latent because the military has been created to neutralize and 
defeat an enemy 
5
 using methods which, compared to the 
rational use of force, due process, mediation of conflicts and 
actions based on respect for civil rights, are classified as 
violent and generators of abuses and human rights violations.  
                                                 
5
 It refers to the military goal within the international law framework 
limited to “establishments, constructions and positions of the armed 
forces…goods that due to their nature, location and purpose, contribute 
to military action; goods which destruction or capture offer a military 
advantage.”   Charter of Humanitarian International Law. 
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The Inter-American Commission on Human Rights argues 
that:   
 
 ... The history of the hemisphere shows that the 
intervention of the Armed Forces in internal security 
matters in general is accompanied by violations of 
human rights in violent contexts, for that reason it 
should be noted that practice recommends the 
avoidance of military intervention in matters of 
internal security because it entails a risk of violations 
of human rights (IACHR, 2009).  
 
For example, consider a case of alleged human rights 
violations by military forces under joint patrols in Mexico.  
A report by the Secretariat of National Defense of Mexico 
(SEDENA) released in August 2010, stresses 4,035 human 
rights violations’ complaints were received from December 
2006 to December 31, 2009.  
  
A publication on Municipal Management of Public Safety in 
Central America and the Dominican Republic showed 
arbitrary abuses by elements of the army in the process of 
"police work" with joint police patrols on roads and rural 
areas as part of the Joint Task Force Group (GFTC) plan, 
have taken place in Guatemala (FLACSO, DEMUCA 
Foundation, 2010).  
 
Corruption and Co-optation  
Despite preparation, effectiveness and efficiency in fulfilling 
their duty, the Armed Forces are vulnerable to co-optation 
and corruption by organized crime.  The analysis of cases 
that have taken place in Latin America (Colombia, 
Guatemala, Mexico) reveals the military can be co-opted by 
criminal gangs to commit crimes, that it could benefit from 
information obtained from the police or allow criminal acts 
in sectors or geographical locations to which they are 
assigned.  They are also vulnerable to participate in 
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distribution and handling of drugs, drug trafficking 
prostitution and human trafficking.  
  
For example, two Guatemalan Army lieutenants were 
captured at El Salvador’s International Airport in June 2010 
when they tried to transport 77 capsules of heroin to the 
United States in a special compartment inside the sole of a 
military boot (El Periódico, 2010).  Another example was 
the capture of a lieutenant charged in the case of the theft of 
43 rifles from the army on August 19, 2009 (El Periódico, 
2010b).  
 
Political Authority Abdicating its Responsibilities  
There is a danger that politicians might abdicate from their 
role of carrying out public policy and guiding the strategic 
and operational actions of the State, thereby transferring 
responsibility to the military.  It will just result in developing 
a military autonomy to solve security problems (as has 
happened in the past within the context of counterinsurgency 
and the resulting human rights violations), which led 
political authority to abdicate its responsibility to control the 
actions of the troops.   In several Latin American countries, 
numerous investigation and prosecution cases of those 
responsible for human rights violations took place after the 
end of the domestic armed conflicts under pressure from 
international organizations of the Inter-American System for 
the Protection of Human Rights.  
 
Diminishing Support for Strengthening the Police Force  
There is also the risk the organizational growth momentum 
of the Armed Forces will take place at the expense of the 
process of strengthening the police force.  Although Central 
American countries are going through a process of 
democratic consolidation, strengthening the police requires 
medium and long term efforts (to readapt regulations, 
support strategic planning in line with regional threats, 
strengthen human resources, and provide adequate resources 
and equipment, etc.).  These processes, which are often slow, 
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do not ensure an impact on public opinion or a decrease in 
violence or crime rates in the short term, particularly in areas 
affected by threats that require operational action exceeding 
these institutions’ current capacity.  
 
In most cases where the military has been called for law 
enforcement activities,  the Executive is relying on the 
credibility enjoyed by the Armed Forces and calling them to 
conduct joint patrols in dangerous or “red” areas.  The goal 
is to project a legitimate interest not only to improve security 
by increasing the number of people assigned to provide it, 
but also to project  the State’s "strength" in combating and 
preventing crime and also, in conducting police 
investigations.  
 
Yet, the decision to assign police responsibilities to the 
Armed Forces also implies giving special attention to the 
military institution, including providing equipment or 
resources it does not possess, since its scope of action is 
external security.  This translates into allocating increased 
financial resources to meet the needs of the military’s 
operational capacity, at the expense of strengthening the law 
enforcement institutions.  
 
SOCIAL IMPLICATIONS  
 
Calling the military in to conduct law enforcement activities 
within the country also has social implications. Some of 
them are discussed below.  
 
Validation of Authoritarianism  
These activities reinforce the opinion of those sectors of the 
population that prefer authoritarian methods, harsher actions 
and who view armies as "saviors of the nation." Historically, 
authoritarianism has had an important social impact linked to 
the creation, strengthening and reproduction of ideas 
legitimizing military action as the best solution to problems 
of a diverse nature which cannot be solved by the State.   
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Due in part to the rise of outward signs of violence, 
delinquency and crime that go hand in hand with the poor 
results achieved by the institutions of the judicial system, 
particularly the perception of the work undertaken by police, 
society demands more security as well as methods perceived 
as more radical, to contain and combat delinquency and 
crime. In this regard, it demands the presence of the Armed 
Forces in public security because they are perceived as 
efficient in the fulfillment of their mission.  
 
Delegitimization of the State’s Capacity to Respond  
Given the hypothetical overflow of the capabilities of joint 
forces, the recurring arbitrariness of the Armed Forces and 
their involvement in crime and corruption, there is a risk of 
losing credibility in the State’s capacity to respond; followed 
by a disappointment in democratic methods to address these 
challenges.  Similarly, the institutional framework, as well as 
military and police forces, could be compromised and 
delegitimized, generating favorable conditions for poor 
governance, systematic violations of the rule of law and 
latent risk of anarchy.  
 
In this scenario, citizens could perform on their own security 
actions normally assigned to the police due to lack of 
credibility.  This can also lead to a strengthening of measures 
of authoritarianism, abuse or social control by individuals or 
communities, an outright rejection of the presence of security 
institutions, increases in cases of social cleansing and 
killings, among other effects.  These actions could create 
conditions that compromise the rule of law.  
 
TECHNICAL IMPLICATIONS  
 
The involvement of the Armed Forces in functions reserved 
for the police also has technical implications, as discussed 
below.  
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Reinforcing the concept of "Saviors of the homeland"  
When military personnel perceive to have been called to face 
a "threat to the homeland," they understand the State uses 
this measure because it urgently requires its institutional 
nature, methods, means and actions, for what they have been 
trained, -- to "destroy," "kill" or "eliminate" whatever 
threatens the country's existence.  
 
In this regard, the Armed Forces claim a “protector role” in 
the destiny of the nation, a pre-eminence with different 
prerogatives from those of common citizens and 
extraordinary freedom and authority to implement their 
methodology for which they believe civilians are 
unprepared. The Armed Forces seek to be allowed to have 
direct participation in operational and strategic political 
decisions that will guarantee they "save the nation" in danger 
of extinction, becoming the National Goal that overrides any 
other consideration (which becomes a secondary issue) and 
that can only be achieved with the military leadership in 
situations where civilians have already failed.  
 
If not controlled from the start with effective measures, this 
self-perception of the military in view of a challenge to "save 
the country" can become a new "wave of militarism" in 
response to aggression and violence from organized crime 
and drug trafficking.  
 
Military Autonomy  
There is the potential for ongoing quests to achieve 
operational autonomy in military actions, especially when 
their effectiveness in the fulfillment of their new missions 
depends on the degree of cohesion to complement the police 
forces, which is quite complicated, as the police forces do 
not have the same methodology and ways of acting. In the 
absence of common processes and procedures guiding 
frameworks of action between the police and military, 
decision making is carried out with greater discretion in the 
execution of tasks, with the danger of overreacting because 
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of indoctrination and methods of action by military 
personnel.  
 
Re-adjustment of the Armed Forces  
Once the military personnel has been in charge of law 
enforcement tasks for a prolonged period of time, it will 
inevitably result in planning, adaptation of doctrine, 
organization, training and logistics of participants, other than 
the usual institutional response within a democratic society, 
as described below.  
 
 Education: The Armed Forces need to train and 
prepare personnel to meet these new roles, especially 
on issues related to the conceptual framework, 
procedures and methods, coordinated planning, work 
organization (including shift work) and logistics. It 
also implies a clear acceptance of the subordination 
to political authority responsible for leading the 
response of the State.     
 
For the police force, this means having the capacity for 
planning, management and leadership in making operational 
decisions to improve the State’s response. In many countries 
of the region, the police do not reach the same professional 
status as the military. For example, in Guatemala there is no 
Training School of the National Police with professional 
university equivalence like in the case of the Polytechnic 
School which trains army officers. However, there is already 
a process, designed for 2020, that aims to solve this issue but 
also to achieve a National Civil Police (PNC, for its acronym 
in Spanish), which could respond to challenges posed by 
crime and violence in the region.  
 
 Standardized concepts and methods: The 
framework of operational complementation (police 
role-military role)  entails standardized concepts and 
methodologies of strategic planning and action with 
the goal of making both forces speak the same 
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language as they work together. It implies working 
on inter-institutional planning defining the mission, 
roles, duties, and deadlines in agreement with the 
national security plan, and entails preventing 
scenarios of action and praxis with an ideal reaction 
of these forces to emerging situations, while 
respecting human rights. 
 State’s Comprehensive Response: In the context of 
the State’s comprehensive response, it involves 
implementing and/or strengthening a system of 
national control as well as an efficient system of 
justice, governing the military and police forces, to 
avoid the repetition of historical errors in relation to 
human rights violations during the period of 
counterinsurgency operations.  
 
CONCLUSION  
 
The environment has become conducive for States to use 
their militaries to address security threats, mainly criminal 
structures with military-style features, which are already 
undermining democratic governance and threatening its very 
existence. In the Central American context, the assignment 
of police functions to the Armed Forces creates an inevitable 
social and political impact, with especially dreadful 
memories of the eras of domestic armed conflict, but also 
affects the relations of the military with the government and 
inside their own institutions.   
  
The involvement of the military in police work, either 
implementing it in isolated cases or giving prominence and 
operational autonomy in developing its new missions, will 
lead to consequences such as an increasing political 
leadership, denaturalization of its main functions, and 
hindering the strengthening of the police forces.  
 
Regarding a social dimension, the involvement of the 
military in police work generates mixed public opinions 
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about their participation and outcomes, but also reinforces 
the idea that armies are "saviors of the nation" as they are 
considered to be the only institution able to implement 
authoritarian and extremely harsh measures to restore order 
and security.  
 
There is a possibility of developing a negative perception 
and lack of legitimacy for the entire institutional security 
framework of Central American States which are unable to 
contain insecurity, despite measures implemented, which 
could lead people to take the law into their own hands or to 
create conditions of real lack of governance.  
 
The army leadership has an internal institutional impact that 
could lead them to become engaged in corruption, including 
co-optation by organized crime and committing human rights 
abuses and outrages committed in the development of these 
new features. Additionally, it will involve organizational 
reforms to adapt these forces in terms of education, training, 
logistics and operational methods to meet new missions.  
 
FINAL CONSIDERATION   
 
Regardless of the constitutional framework, legal norms and 
other mechanisms covering political decisions to employ 
Armed Forces in duties traditionally assigned to police, these 
should be more closely scrutinized taking into account the 
threat to be faced and in particular the impact on governance 
of the State and its capacity for action and maneuverability 
against criminal structures.  This situation will enable States 
to decide more objectively and precisely what, when and 
where to use the Armed Forces in public security in order to 
optimize their responses, minimize implications described, 
sustain the legitimacy of the decision to society and at the 
same time, embark on a real process of strengthening the 
police forces.  
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In this context, it is necessary to define the roles and 
responsibilities for action in the field of security and 
complementation between the two forces, according to the 
Framework Treaty on Democratic Security (TMSD) and the 
strategic guidelines emanating from the highest operational 
political authority of the State. Thus, the response of the 
States shall allow strategic and operational actions to 
respond to national objectives with clear mechanisms of 
political command and control, coordination, communication 
and complementation between the actors involved at the 
implementation level.  
 
In this line of thought, the Armed Forces should prioritize 
and address threats in the field of their expertise (border 
control and protection), while serving in a support-
cooperation capacity to the police force within the national 
territory, as they achieve quality standards required by police 
forces.  This implies that border control and security is taken 
by the Armed Forces as an assigned mission, affecting its 
current deployment with a comprehensive strategy for 
coordinated action with the police, which defines political 
control, clear goals and tasks; respecting the functions of 
civil customs authorities established by the country's legal 
system.  
 
In the framework of support to police forces, actions must be 
developed under the leadership and guidance from the 
political authority and led by police personnel with excellent 
training and professional experience, capable of making 
decisions in situations that inevitably arise in confrontation 
with delinquents and criminals. Therefore, the militaries of 
these States should recognize the full authority of their Home 
Offices or Ministries of Interior.  
 
To this end, it is necessary to standardize the methodological 
concepts of strategic operations and operating procedures to 
facilitate joint action between political authorities, police and 
military, with the purpose of achieving effectiveness in 
15 
 
fulfilling the tasks to be assigned in accordance with the 
national security plan. This is intended to promote and 
strengthen both a control system and system of justice to 
avoid a violent response from government forces and 
repeated violation of human rights as happened during the 
period of counterinsurgency (1960-1996).  
 
16 
 
ABOUT THE AUTHOR  
 
Rodolfo F. Robles-Montoya is a Researcher and Senior 
Advisor in the areas of Security, Defense and Intelligence at 
the Myrna Mack Foundation in Guatemala. His expertise has 
led him to participate in the reform of the security, defense 
and intelligence institutions in Guatemala. In 2004, Robles 
contributed to the design of the new Army Doctrine. In 2008, 
he provided input for the Framework Act on the National 
Security System (Law DL Nº 18-2008). He is currently 
engaged in the creation and implementation of a new 
General Inspection System for the Guatemala’s Security 
System, as well as in the process of Police Reform, 
particularly in the area of institutional internal controls.  
 
Robles-Montoya is an engineer who served in the Peruvian 
Army. He holds a MA in Administration from the Federico 
Villarreal National University in Peru, a Certificate in 
National Strategy Studies from ETSNA Center in 
Guatemala, and a Certificate in Strategic Studies from the 
Guatemalan Army. He is currently completing another MA 
in International Studies at the Francisco Marroquín 
University in Guatemala. Robles is the author of "Propuesta 
de un Sistema de Inteligencia Nacional para Guatemala" 
(June 2003) and of "Lineamientos democráticos para una 
nueva Ley Constitutiva del Ejército y marco legal para la 
función militar" (2004). He also served as Coordinator for 
Research and Publication of the "Estudio Comparativo de 
Policías Latinoamericanas: Bolivia, Chile, Perú, Ecuador, 
Colombia, Nicaragua y Mexico," (2008). 
 
The Myrna Mack Foundation in Guatemala, established in 
1993, conducts research and proposes public policies that 
support human rights, rule of law, and the consolidation of 
peace and democracy.  Inspired by the work of Myrna E. 
Mack Chang, a young social anthropologist who was 
assassinated in 1990 by Guatemala’s intelligence services 
while conducting research on the displaced population, the 
17 
 
Foundation has pursued justice for Myrna Mack in national 
and international courts, hoping to end the impunity 
surrounding this and other similar cases. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
18 
 
WHEMSAC PUBLICATIONS 
PHASE II 
Ivelaw Lloyd Griffith, “The Re-Emergence of Suriname’s 
Désiré (Desi) Bouterse: Political Acumen and Geopolitical 
Anxiety.” June 2011. 
 
Paola Prado, “The Impact of the Internet in Six Latin 
American Countries.” June 2011.  
 
Harold Trinkunas, “International Bolivarianism and its 
Influence.” June 2011. 
 
David Scott Palmer and Alberto Bolívar, “Peru’s Shining 
Path: Recent Dynamics and Future Prospects.” May 2011. 
 
Erich de la Fuente, “ALBA: A Political Tool for Venezuela’s 
Foreign Policy.” May 2011. 
 
Norman Munroe, “Climate Change and Regions at Risk: A 
Look at Central America.” May 2011. 
 
Juan Pablo Sarmiento & Gabriela Hoberman, “Disaster Risk 
Management Disparity in the Caribbean: Evidence from 
Barbados, Dominican Republic, Jamaica and Trinidad and 
Tobago.” May 2011. 
 
Daniel E. Moreno, “The Indigenous in Plurinational Bolivia: 
Perceptions of Indigenous People in Bolivia Before and 
During the Morales Government.” April 2011. 
 
Raúl L. Madrid, “Indigenous Movements, Democracy, and 
U.S. Interests in Latin America.” April 2011. 
 
Thomas Bruneau, “An Analysis of the Implications of Joint 
Military Structures in Argentina, Brazil, Chile, and 
Colombia.” April 2011. 
19 
 
Rut Diamint, Pablo Policzer and Michael Shifter, “Latin 
American Coups: Have They Vanished or Taken New 
Shapes?” March 2011. 
 
Antonio L. Mazzitelli, “The New Transatlantic Bonanza: 
Cocaine on Highway 10.” March 2011. 
 
Carlos Pereira, “Brazil Under Dilma Rousseff: Similar 
Policy Directions Maintained.” March 2011.  
 
Patricio Navia, “Venezuela and Chile: Two opposite Paths of 
Democratic Consolidation and Economic Development.” 
March 2011. 
 
Miguel L. Castillo-Girón, “Land Ownership Transfers in 
Petén, Guatemala.” February 2011. 
 
ARC, “Latin America and the Caribbean in 2011 and 
Beyond.” February 2011. 
 
Iñigo Guevara Moyano, “Defense Expenditures: Argentina, 
Chile, Uruguay, and Paraguay.” December 2010. 
 
Bradley S. Porter, “Altered Landscapes or Arms Race? 
Making Sense of Military Spending in 
South America.” November 2010. 
 
Iñigo Guevara Moyano, “Defense Expenditure: Andean and 
Amazon Regions.” November 2010. 
 
Ambassador Peter DeShazo, “Consolidating Security and 
Development in Colombia: Lessons for Peru and Panama.” 
November 2010. 
 
Johanna Mendelson-Forman, “South American Defense 
Council: What it means for regional security?” November 
2010. 
 
20 
 
Erich de la Fuente, “Cuba’s Role in Venezuela’s Control of 
the Internet and Online Social Networks.” October 2010. 
 
Marifeli Perez-Stable, “Raul Castro’s Government: Recent 
Economic Reforms and Some Political Considerations.” 
October 2010. 
 
Iñigo Guevara Moyano, “Defense Expenditures: Central 
America and Dominican Republic.” September 2010. 
 
Hal Brands, “Criminal Fiefdoms in Latin America: 
Understanding the Problem of Alternatively Governed 
Spaces.” September 2010. 
 
ARC, “Honduras’ Stressed Social Fabric: Instability and 
Risks.” August 2010. 
 
CTC and ARC, “Uranium in Latin America: Reserves, 
Energy, and Security Implications.” August 2010. 
 
John Proni, “Independent Monitoring of the Cuban 
Economic Zone Oil Development.” July 2010. 
 
Kristina Mani, “Military Entrepreneurship in Latin America: 
A Brief Overview.” June 2010. 
 
Bruce Bagley and Olga Nazario, “Lithium and Bolivia: The 
Promise and the Problems.” June 2010.  
 
Brian Fonseca, “Domestic Politics in the Dominican 
Republic after the Earthquake in Haiti.” June 2010.  
 
PHASE I 
 
Brian Fonseca, “Human Smuggling & The Terrorist-
Criminal Nexus.” January 2009. 
 
21 
 
Arturo Contreras and Francisco Ledantec, “General 
Overview of Transnational Threats in Latin America with a 
Special Focus in South America & Its Effect on International 
Security and US-Latin American Relations.” December 
2008.  
 
Thomas Bruneau, “Civil Military Relations in Democratic 
Latin America.” December 2008. 
 
Brian Fonseca, “Identifying Opportunities for US-Cuba 
Military Cooperation.” December 2008. 
 
Harold A. Trinkunas, “Understanding Venezuelan Strategic 
Culture.” December 2008. 
 
Joanna Mateo, “US-Brazil: Forging a New Relationship.” 
November 2008.  
 
Joanna Mateo, “Las Maras in Honduras.” November 2008.  
 
Joanna Mateo, “Advancing Security Cooperation in the 
Americas: An Historical Perspective.” August 2008.  
 
Julio A. Cirino, “The Media Component in a Visual Culture 
and the Spread of Populism in Latin America: Exploring the 
Spiral of Silence.” June 2008. 
 
Brian Fonseca and Evan Ellis, “Emerging Relationships: 
China and Latin America.” May 2008.  
 
Joanna Mateo, “Gang Violence in Central America: The 
Case of Honduras. Identifying a Role for USSOUTHCOM.” 
April 2008.  
 
Anthony P. Maingot, “The New Geopolitics of the Andes: 
The Dangers of a State-on-State War.” April 2008.  
 
22 
 
Joanna Mateo, “Health Threats to Stability in the Americas.” 
February 2008.  
 
Brian Fonseca, “Emerging Relationships: Iran & Latin 
America.” February 2008.  
 
Brian Fonseca, “Energy Outlook: Brazil.” January 2008. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 23 
 
NOTES: 
_______________________________________________________
_______________________________________________________
_______________________________________________________
_______________________________________________________
_______________________________________________________
_______________________________________________________
_______________________________________________________
_______________________________________________________
_______________________________________________________
_______________________________________________________
_______________________________________________________
_______________________________________________________
_______________________________________________________
_______________________________________________________
_______________________________________________________
_______________________________________________________
_______________________________________________________
_______________________________________________________
_______________________________________________________
_______________________________________________________
_______________________________________________________
_______________________________________________________
_______________________________________________________
_______________________________________________________
_______________________________________________________
__________________________________________________ 
_______________________________________________________


